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Insects join the consciousness fray 






Abstract:  Klein & Barron's review of recent insect neurobiology helps correct the impression 
that insect behavior is orchestrated without the benefit of central integrative mechanisms. 
Given their existence, the authors go on to ask whether these central mechanisms also 
feature the kind of integrative operations that support sentience, and propose that they do. 
Along the way they raise a number of conceptual and evidentiary issues of fundamental 
importance for the neuroscience of consciousness, allowing me to comment favorably on a 
number of them. I conclude by pointing to ways in which the conception of insect sentience 
they outline might be tested empirically. 
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Progress in mapping the phylogenetic distribution of sentience has been hampered by a 
paucity of evidence about central integrative neural arrangements in species other than 
vertebrates. It has even been claimed that members of a major taxonomic group of 
invertebrates, the insects, function without central integrative mechanisms of the kind 
typical of vertebrates (Altman & Kien, 1989; Merker, 2007; but see Merker, 2005, p. 107). To 
the extent that conceptions of sentience rely on central integrative functions, this would 
imply that such animals might be insentient altogether.  
 
Not so, according to Klein & Barron (2016) and the earlier work of theirs on which they build 
(Barron & Klein, 2016). By reviewing recent evidence for integrative functional arrangements 
in the insect brain, they open avenues for exploring the bearing of that evidence on the 
question of insect sentience. Their adoption, in so doing, of a minimal definition of sentience 
as the capacity for mere experience is well taken, and is — as they themselves point out — 
more than an expedient tailored to limitations of "lowly" insects. It is, rather, a matter of 
principle, because the issue of what kinds of neural arrangements are needed to implement 
a sentient state of any kind is prior to all questions regarding what contents might occupy 
such a state. It is, in other words, foundational for the neuroscience of consciousness.  
 
One aspect of this foundational issue concerns whether neuron numbers are critical for the 
neural implementation of sentience. The authors are to be commended for discounting the 
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significance of neuron numbers in this regard. If a sentience state is a function of particular 
structural arrangements of neurons, those arrangements might be implemented on vastly 
different scales, with neuron number serving variables such as the sophistication and 
resolution of the contents of that state, or the learning-based nature of those contents. An 
instructive analogy for a function reliant on a scaleable structural arrangement is DNA 
replication. As a function of the double-stranded structure of DNA, held together by weak 
hydrogen bonds, the mechanism of replication works the same way whether short 
sequences of few base pairs or long ones composed of millions are being replicated. 
Similarly, if sentience is a function of particular structural arrangements of neural operations, 
these may be present in brains of vastly different size.  
 
There is also no reason to believe that the mechanism of sentience even in large brains 
requires more than a subset, even a small subset, of available neurons. The entire content of 
a monocular, monochromatic human visual percept at full psychophysical resolution is a 
matter of only some 164,000 pixels when the fall-off in acuity with eccentricity is taken into 
account (Rojer & Schwartz, 1990; see also Merker, 2013, p. 3). In principle it could therefore 
be implemented by the same number of neurons serving as picture elements. There is, 
moreover, no reason to believe that a visual percept needs to have anything close to our 
level of resolution to be useful.  
 
Why such a percept needs to be experienced in order to be useful is of course the central 
crux of consciousness theory. One answer to that question is that mobile, spatially orienting 
animals stand to reap energetic savings by integrating target selection, action selection, and 
motivational ranking at a central convergent interface for behavioral decision-making. 
Functional considerations favor a doubly nested arrangement of that interface, such that a 
decision-making egocenter is lodged within a neural body map, which is in turn lodged 
within a neural world map. When held together by a shared egocentric coordinate system 
such an arrangement yields the first-person perspective of confronting a world from inside a 
body, which is the typical condition of sentience (Merker, 2007, 2013. For circumstances 
under which the body-map requirement may be relaxed, see Merker, 2005, p. 107).  
 
Klein & Barron's treatment goes a long way towards making midline-straddling portions of 
the insect protocerebrum plausible candidates for the implementation of such a first-person 
interface. It is now possible to explore this proposal along both physiological and behavioral 
lines. Physiological studies are needed to determine whether the critical informational 
modalities that converge in this part of the insect brain indeed do so by interfacing in a 
shared egocentric coordinate space, so that their joint operation yields a sentient state. And 
behavioral studies are needed to delineate the role played by this candidate mechanism in 
the functional economy of insect behavior as a whole. To this end several types of behavior 
reviewed by Brembs (2011) as evidence for operationally well-defined "free will" in insects 
might be explored.  
 
Brembs himself downplays the potential bearing of these behaviors on the issue of 
sentience. It is worth noting, however, that they typically occur in the waking state only. 
Given the possibility of insect sentience, an insect analog of "absence epilepsy" would 
partition this waking state into episodes supporting only automatisms on the one hand 
(insentient wakefulness), and episodes featuring the behaviors addressed by Brembs on the 
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other (sentient wakefulness). This would be as close to a demonstration of sentience in 
insects as a third-person perspective is likely to take us. Klein & Barron are to be 
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